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Still No Remedy After All These Years:
Plugging the Hole in the Law of Leaking
Underground Storage Tanks
JASON M. BASILE'

INTRODUCTION

Below the ground in the United States, there lie approximately two million
underground storage tanks ("USTs"),' most of which contain petroleum.2 Over
eighty percent of these USTs are made of bare, unprotected steel. Rust and
corrosion inevitably deteriorate aging tanks creating "a prescription for leaks." 4
Indeed, in 1986, the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") estimated that.
eighteen to thirty-five percent of the then 1.6 million tanks were leaking. As
tanks that were buried (and often abandoned) in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s
continue to age, the problem will only become worse.
What makes leaking USTs a "problem of national significance"' is the fact that
the leak of one gallon of gasoline can contaminate the entire groundwater supply
of a town of 50,000 people.6 And over half of the United States's drinking water
comes from groundwater.7 Petroleum's chemical constituents are listed in the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980 ("CERCLA")' as hazardous substances, 9 and exposure or ingestion of
petroleum-contaminated water could lead to a variety of ailments including
cancer and even death.' ° For these reasons, the problem of leaking USTs has

* J.D. Candidate, 1998, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington. I thank my
wonderful family for patiently enduring the one holiday season when I talked of little other
than underground storage tanks. I also thank Thomas A. Bamard and Melina M. Kennedy for
their helpful suggestions. Finally, I would like to thank the entire staff of the IndianaLaw
Journalfor their hard work.
1. See HAZARDOUS AND SOLID WASTE AMENDMENTS OF 1984, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 981133, at 128, reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5699 (reporting the EPA's estimate).
2. See Underground Storage Tanks; Technical Requirements, 52 Fed. Reg. 12,662, 12,664
(1987).

3. See Don Ritter, Forewordto MICHAEL L. ITALIANO

ET AL., LIABILITY FOR STORAGE

TANKS at xxiii, xxiii (2d ed. 1992).

4. Id. at xxiv.
5. Id. at xxiii.
6. See ITALIANO Er AL., supranote 3, at 3-4.
7. See Ritter, supranote 3, at xxiv.
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
9. See id. § 9601(14).
10. See John A. Chanin, Comment, LUST on Your Corner: Strict Liability, Victim
Compensation, and Leaking UndergroundStorage Tanks, 62 U. COLO. L. REv. 365, 371-72

(1991) (citing NEW
GASOLINE (1985)).
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been called a "national ... 6pidemic that presents an imminent hazard to the
health of millions of American[s].""
What remedies are available to people injured by this "epidemic"? The short
answer is that there often are no real remedies available, due to some "gaping
loopholes" in the regulatory scheme.' 2 For example, CERCLA provides a "citizen
suit" mechanism in which private citizens can sue polluters to recover for some
of the harms they have suffered. 3 While victims of nearly all hazardous-waste
contamination may be remedied by this citizen suit, those who have been victims
of petroleum contamination are barred from suing under CERCLA because
of the
4
exclusion of petroleum in CERCLA's definition of a hazardous waste.
The primary federal statute that regulates USTs is Subtitle I of the Resources
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 ("RCRA").' 5 Yet while victims of a
leaking UST might be able to bring a citizen suit against prior owners or
operators of the UST under RCRA, they are likely to be disappointed. The main
available relief is enforcement of RCRA's regulations, and the only provisions
in RCRA allowing for monetary fines are civil penalties that can only be paid to
the government. 6 In 1996, the Supreme Court further limited the ability of USTleak victims to recover expended RCRA costs routinely recovered by victims of
7
other hazardous substances.'
In the absence of a federal statute that allows leaking-UST victims to seek
compensation, victims have looked to state UST statutes and common-law causes
of action. Unfortunately, state UST statutes generally mirror their federal RCRA
counterpart. And common-law suits are marked by interminable litigation and
often insurmountable issues of causation and fault. Even Congress has stated that
in these type of common-law actions, "the victim ... is fighting against the
odds."' 8
The laws relating to USTs are remarkably complex, yet shockingly ineffective.
In fact, UST regulations form a microcosm of what many observers consider
environmental
law's "two vital defects: incomprehensibility and
ineffectiveness."' 9 This Note proposes changes that not only make UST laws
more effective, but also make their remedies more complete and the regulatory
scheme less complex. In terms of complexity, environmental law already can be

11. Superfund: Hearings on Leaking UndergroundGasolineStorage Tanks Before the
Subcomm. on Commerce, Transp., and Tourism of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 99th Cong. 1007 (1985) (statement of Rep. Thomas J. Downey).
12. Industry Opposes Tightening RCRA Rules, OIL &GAS J., Sept. 16, 1991, at 41, 41.
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)-(g).
14. See id. § 9601(14).
15. Id. §§ 6901-6992k.
16. See id. § 6928(a), (g); see also Kevin R. Duncan & B. Todd Bailey, Innocence Amid
"LUST": The Innocent Buyer and Leaking Underground Storage Tanks Containing
Petroleum, 7 BYU J. PuB. L. 245, 260 (1993) (noting that the available remedies do not
provide damages to an innocent purchaser).
17. See Meghrig v. KFC W. Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1251 (1996).
18. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON PuB. WORKS AND TRANSP., 96TH CONG., COMPENSATION
FOR VICTIMS OF WATER POLLUTION 12 (Comm. Print 1979).

19. Bradley C. Bobertz, Legitimizing Pollution Through Pollution Control Laws:
Reflections on ScapegoatingTheory, 73 TEX. L. REV. 711, 712 (1995).
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grouped with tax law." Part of the blame for this complexity should be
Congress's penchant for responding to perceived inadequacies in one complex
law by overlaying it with a separate, equally complex law' The proposals in this
Note attempt to fix inadequacies without proposing an entirely new regulatory
scheme. And just as a searching analysis of UST laws reveals modifications and
simplifications that would greatly enhance their effectiveness, so would a close
study of other areas of environmental law likely reveal similar improvements.
This Note first examines the problem of leaking USTs and the harm they cause.
It then surveys the statutory and common-law remedies available to victims of
leaking USTs and highlights the inequitable gap in the regulatory scheme. Part
II then sets forth five proposals, each designed to fill that gap.
I. THE CURRENT LAW OF USTs

A. The Damage Caused by Leaking USTs

Leaking USTs cause a variety of forms of damage. The most serious damage
caused by leaking USTs is contamination of groundwater. One-half of the United
States' population relies upon groundwater for its drinking water and threefourths of American cities rely at least in part on groundwater for their drinking
water.22 And because of the nation's declining supply of surface water, these
percentages have been increasing and are likely to continue increasing.23
Once a tank leaks, the liquid moves quickly through aerated soil and into an
unsaturated zone.2' Usually this process of liquid percolation from the surface,
or neaf the surface, down into an unsaturated zone is one of the reasons
groundwater is an attractive source of drinking water. That is because as a liquid
moves downward, the rocks act as filters, effectively breaking down organic
pollutants. Unfortunately, this process does not remove inorganic pollutants,
which are found in gasoline. And when chemical contaminants move through the
filtering rocks, that area is itself contaminated. Then, any water that subsequently
moves through the filter zone will also be contaminated. When gasoline leaks
into the ground, therefore, the filtering rocks as well as the adjacent underground
water supply are contaminated, and they remain contaminated until they are
artificially removed.25
Because of the extensive contamination that generally occurs when a UST
leaks, corrective action for a single site can require months or even years to
complete, and can range in cost from $20,000 to $1 million?6 Due to this cost
and because most federal and state statutes impose strict liability for clean-up
costs on the landowner--even if she is an innocent purchaser without knowledge

20. See id at 713 n.9.
21. See infra Part I.
22. See Chanin, supra note 10, at 369.
23. See Ritter, supranote 3, at xxiv.
24. See Chanin, supra note 10, at 370.

25. See ic
26. See Duncan & Bailey, supra note 16, at 247.
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of the presence of the UST-USTs have been called the "scourge of the nation's
commercial real estate business."27
As serious as the financial burdens of leaking USTs are, they pale in
comparison to the health risks presented by groundwater contaminated by leaking
USTs. Gasoline's chemical constituents include benzene, xylene, ethylbenzene,
and toluene-all listed as hazardous substances in CERCLA. 28 Benzene is a
known carcinogen, and the exposure to each of these substances has been proven
to cause a variety of maladies in humans.29
Victims of leaking USTs can suffer a wide range of damages. These include
death, cancer, lung damage, birth defects, unconsciousness, fear of cancer,
depression, medical monitoring, loss of property value, and lost wages. ° The
direct and indirect damages due to leaking USTs at a single location have been
claimed to be as high as $100 million.3'
Those in Congress have known about the damages caused by toxic substances
which "may impose sudden, massive costs on innocent parties ... [and] victims
of pollution often find they must bear the costs of the disaster."32 Despite all the
damage caused by leaking USTs, and Congress's knowledge of the damage,
leaking-UST victims have found themselves excluded from an adequate remedy.
B. CERCLA: The Petroleum Exclusion

CERCLA was the final major new law of the environmental-law movement that
first began in the 1960s with the passage of the Clean Air Act.33 The Clean Water
Act34 and then RCRA followed. The early environmental movement
underestimated the problems that arise from dumping toxins into the land, due
to scientists' overestimation of the power of the soil to clean itself.35 But after the
highly publicized discovery of forgotten toxic waste seeping into people's homes
in Niagara Falls, New York (the "Love Canal" incident), the issue of hidden
toxic wastes moved to the forefront of the environmental-law movement.36
Congress passed CERCLA in December, 1980, after the November, 1980
elections had rendered President Carter and many Democrats in Congress lame

27. Id. at 248.
28. See Wilshire Westwood Assocs. v. Atlantic Richfield Corp., 881 F.2d 801, 803 (9th
Cir. 1989).
29. See Chanin, supra note 10, at 371-72.
30. See id. at 374-78.
31. See id. at 376.

32. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON PUB. WORKS AND TRANSP., 96TH CONG., COMPENSATION
(Comm. Print 1979).
33. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1994) (originally enacted as Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 88-

FOR VICTIMS OF WATER POLLuTION 25-27

206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963)).
34. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994) (originally enacted as Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No.
92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972)).
35. See BRADFORD F. WHITMAN, SUPERFUND LAW AND PRACTICE 4 (1991); Roger

Armstrong, Comment, CERCLA's PetroleumExclusion: Bad Policy in a ProblematicStatute,
27 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1157, 1159-60 (1994).
36. See Armstrong, supranote 35, at 1160.
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ducks." CERCLA became a rushed eleventh-hour compromise of competing
House and Senate bills. The feeling was that something needed to be pushed
through because the incoming administration would largely ignore the issue of
toxic waste. 8 The bill that eventually became CERCLA began in the House as
'
the "Hazardous Waste Containment Act."39
That bill regulated the clean-up and
monitoring of inactive hazardous-waste sites that were on land.4" It specifically
excluded petroleum due to the concurrent consideration of the "Oil Pollution
Liability and Compensation Act,"' which dealt exclusively with the clean-up of
oil spills.4" Both H.R. 7020 and H.R. 85 passed in the House and were sent to the
Senate. The Senate then passed a modified version of H.R. 7020, but rejected
4
H.R. 85. 1
This dropping of the oil-pollution bill (H.R. 85) seemed acceptable to many
senators because the feeling was that the domestic oil industry could not handle
the added liability: it was troubled financially and was already paying a heavy tax
to fund a portion of the new Superfund." Indeed, at a time when gas prices were
high and lines were long at gas stations, there was fear that further increasing gas
prices would send America's "troubled economy into a deeper recession."4 Also,
in 1980, there was a lack of recognition of the magnitude of the potential
problem that leaking USTs posed.46 Given the eleventh-hour mentality of
Congress, the legislators "must have been aware that the oil industry would not
have acceded to such a measure without a fight .... Thus, in a compromise
effort to get the bill passed, Congress may have simply developed the petroleum
exclusion to avoid pressure from the oil industry's strong lobby. 47
Congress included the petroleum exclusion in CERCLA, and subsequent
attempts to repeal it have all failed.0 After a "hastily conceived and rushed"
history,49 CERCLA provides a broad range of remedies for private parties to
enforce the provisions of the Act and recover for some of the harms they have
suffered."0 Unfortunately for the victims of leaking USTs, however, CERCLA's
petroleum exclusion denies them the remedies available to victims of other
spilled and abandoned toxic substances.
CERCLA offers two different causes of action through which private parties
can recover clean-up costs: private cost-recovery actions and contribution

37. See id at 1164-65.
38. See id.at 1165.
39. H.R. 7020, 96th Cong. (1980).
40. See Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensationand Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J.ENVTL. L. 1,
4(1982).
41. H.R. 85, 96th Cong. (1979).
42. See Grad, supranote 40, at 3.
43. See id. at 4.
44. See Armstrong, supra note 35, at 1171.
45. Id. at 1173.
46. See id. at 1172.
47. Id.
48. See infra Part II.A.
49. Armstrong, supranote 35, at 1166.
50. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)-(g) (1994); see also Duncan & Bailey, supra note 16, at 261.
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actions."' In a private cost-recovery action, parties may recover all or part of their
clean-up costs, even without government involvement in the site! 2 A contribution
action occurs when a party is ordered by the government to clean up a site and
the party seeks other responsible parties to share the cost of clean-up. 3
Yet neither cause of action may proceed unless there is a substance at the site
that a court determines to be a "hazardous substance." 54 CERCLA specifically
excludes petroleum from its "hazardous substance" definition: "The term
[hazardous substance] does not include petroleum, including crude oil or any
fraction thereof ... ."" Subsequent judicial interpretation of this definition has
clarified the scope of the exclusion. 6 These cases have held that despite the fact
that some of petroleum's indigenous components and additives are specifically
designated as hazardous substances under CERCLA, the exclusion removes
refined and unrefined petroleum from the reach of CERCLA. 57
So the threshold issue for a CERCLA cause, of action is whether the injured
party was harmed by a hazardous substance other than petroleum and its
indigenous components and common additives. Since the vast majority of USTs
contain petroleum," usually CERCLA will not aid the victim of a leaking UST.
C. RCRA and State UST Programs:An Incomplete
Remedy
Enacted in 1984, federal regulation of USTs is based on Subtitle I of RCRA 9
RCRA generally governs the storage, treatment, and disposal of solid and
hazardous wastes. The regulations include provisions requiring, among other
things, notification of tank existence," leak detection, 6' release reporting, 62 and
corrective action.63 Subtitle I initially calls for the EPA to enforce the UST
regulations, but it allows states to assume responsibility for enforcement.' Thus
far, ten states have received EPA approval for their UST programs, 65 and while

51. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B); id. § 9613(f).
52. See id. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
53. See id. § 9613(f)(1).
54. See Duncan & Bailey, supra note 16, at 261.
55.42 U.S.C. § 9601(14).
56. See Wilshire Westwood Assocs. v. Atlantic Richfield Corp., 881 F.2d 801 (9th Cir.
1989) (interpreting the scope of the petroleum exclusion); see also Cose v. Getty Oil Co., 4
F.3d 700 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that crude-oil-tank bottoms are not petroleum within the
meaning of CERCLA's petroleum exclusion).
57. See Wilshire, 881 F.2d at 810.
58. See Underground Storage Tanks; Technical Requirements, 52 Fed. Reg. 12,662, 12,664
(1987).
59. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6991-6991i.
60. See id. § 6991a(a).
61. See id. § 6991b(c)(1).
62. See id. § 699lb(c)(3).
63. See id. § 6991b(c)(4).
64. See id. § 6991c(a).
65. See Duncan &Bailey, supra note 16, at 250 (reporting that ten states have approval and
two have tentative approval).
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the state programs supplant RCRA, most of the state programs mirror RCRA's
provisions. 66
RCRA provides for citizen suits to enforce the regulations of the Act. 67 Under
the citizen-suit provision, a private party is allowed to maintain an injunctive
action compelling another person to comply with the requirements of RCRA.68
The statute requires the party to give ninety days written notice to the EPA, the
state, and the alleged violator prior to filing suit.69 The citizen suit may be used
against any generator, transporter, owner, or operator who contributes or
contributed to the past or present handling, storage, treatment, or disposal of any
solid or hazardous waste which may present an imminent and substantial
endangerment to health or the environment.!' The basic RCRA program, passed
in 1976, regulates present and future hazardous substances from the "cradle-tograve.'
The key problem for victims of leaking USTs is that Congress passed
CERCLA after RCRA in order to work as a complement to RCRA. CERCLA
covers areas not addressed by RCRA,' namely the means to address abandoned
waste sites and to more fully collect past clean-up expenses from other
responsible parties.' So together, RCRA and CERCLA provide a comprehensive
scheme for regulating hazardous waste, except in the area of petroleum. Because
Subtitle I did not attempt to mimic all the provisions of CERCLA, this gap still
exists with leaking USTs.74 In fact, tanks abandoned prior to 1974, or prior to
1986 if the owners stopped participating in the petroleum-marketing industry by
1986, cannot be regulated in any way by RCRA. 7 This large group is not bound
by RCRA's regulations or even its minimal cost-recovery provisions.
Further, none of the listed remedies in RCRA's citizen-suit provisions allows
a party to collect damages. And indeed, no court has awarded damages under
RCRA's citizen-suit provisions to a victim of a leaking UST. 76 Recently,
however, some resourceful attorneys have attempted to find a way to imply a
cause of action in Subtitle I of RCRA.

66. See id.; see also infra Part II.D (discussing Indiana statute that expands leaking-UST
liability beyond RCRA).
67. See 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a).
68. See id.
69. See id. § 6972(b).
70. See id. § 6972(a)(1)(B).
71. David R.Case, Resource Conservationand Recovery Act (RCRA), in ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW HANDBOOK 406, 406 (J. Gordon Arbuckle et al. eds., 1 th ed. 1991).
72. See Richard G. Stoll, Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
LiabilityAct (CERCLA or Superfund), in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK, supranote 71,
at 75, 75.
73. See id. at 93.
74. See Armstrong, supranote 35, at 1190-91.
75. See id. at 1191; see also MARY DEVINE WOROBEC & CHERYL HOGUE, ToXIC
SUBSTANCES CONTROLS GUIDE 195

(1992).

76. See Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 316 (6th Cir. 1985); Duncan &
Bailey, supranote 16, at 260.
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D. RCRA and Meghrig: Hope Given and Hope Taken
Away
The UST victims inMeghrigv. KFC Western, Inc. ' were not seeking damages
under RCRA, but only recovery of UST-remediation costs from a prior property
owner, costs that are regularly recoverable under CERCLA. RCRA expressly
provides that if a governmental body remedies, it may recover remediation
costs.7" The landowners in Meghrig remedied and then argued that an implied
cause of action existed under RCRA for them to recover those costs from prior
owners. The Ninth Circuit allowed the implied cause of action, 9 holding that it
would be inequitable and poor policy to allow RCRA to bar restitution actions:
By doing so, we would make the citizen suit remedy meaningless in most
cases for the very citizens who most deserve the remedy, namely innocent
citizens, like [plaintiffs], who have a financial stake in the contaminated
property as well as potential and actual clean-up liability. . . . [T]he
government often orders innocent parties . . . to remedy discovered

contamination on their property even though they did not cause the
contamination or have any ties to the property when the contamination
occurred. When the government orders clean-up, the innocent citizen must
respond expeditiously to the order. There is no time to sue for "other
equitable relief' in the form of a mandatory clean-up injunction against past
polluters ....
CERCLA and state law do not provide an adequate substitute source of
relief for these innocent citizens....
In fact, it is even more important for private citizens, as compared to the
EPA Administrator, to have a restitutionary remedy under RCRA."
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding that while remedying
plaintiffs may seek an injunction, they may not recover past costs from former
owners." The Court compared RCRA's citizen suit with CERCLA's and noted
that since CERCLA included provisions allowing recovery of past remediation
costs, RCRA's failure to provide for recovery indicates congressional intent not
to allow recovery of remediation costs under RCRA.82
So while the Ninth Circuit decision seemed to indicate that at least some courts
would be receptive to an argument implying a cause of action under RCRA for
UST victims similar to the express provisions of CERCLA for other toxic-waste
victims, the Supreme Court extinguished that flicker of hope.83 Once again,

77. 116 S.Ct. 1251, 1253 (1996).
78. See 42 U.S.C. § 6978 (1994).
79. See KFC W., Inc. v. Meghrig, 49 F.3d 518, 521 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 1251.
80. Id. at 523-24 (footnotes omitted).
81. See Meghrig, 116 S. Ct. at 1256.
82. See id.
at 1254-56.

83. Meghrig only dealt with the recovery of past remediation costs by a present landowner.
It did not address the issue of an injured party implying a cause of action under RCRA to
recover damages for physical injuries and damage to property values due to a leaking UST.
However, this would be more tenuous than implying the right to recover past remediation costs
(which the government can do under RCRA), so itprobably can be safely assumed the Court
would reject any attempts to further imply RCRA rights. Indeed, trial
courts have now begun
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victims of UST leaks are left without an adequate remedy for the damages they
suffer, and they are forced to look elsewhere for more complete compensation.
E. Common-Law Actions: Too Many Obstacles
Before the extensive federal regulatory scheme existed, individuals injured by
leaking USTs found their only recourse in the common law." Regardless of how
effective these common-law actions had been in the past, with the advent of
federal and state UST regulations, courts have become more hostile to commonlaw, leaking-UST causes of action. Consequently, most UST litigation now
concentrates on who has to pay what percentage of the state- or federal-ordered
remediation.8 5 However, victims of leaking USTs, largely excluded by the
regulatory scheme, have usually found themselves forced to pursue a commonlaw cause of action in order to have any hope of recovering the damages caused
by leaking USTs.
The first obstacle a victim of a leaking UST must avoid to maintain a commonlaw action against a polluter is the issue of whether the federal and/or state UST
statutes preempt common-law actions. Because RCRA specifically allows
delegation of UST regulation to the state by way of state UST statutes, it is clear
that RCRA does not preempt state UST statutes. 86 However, state UST statutes,
or federal ones where no approved state plan exists, often are interpreted to
preempt common-law actions!' Thus, this first obstacle is often fatal to the
common-law suit.
Assuming the court allows the plaintiff to bring a common-law cause of action,
the most powerful common-law cause of action for recovering the damage caused
by leaking USTs is strict liability. A person may be strictly liable for damages
when the damages arise from an activity that is abnormally dangerous 8 In order
to win, the plaintiff must show that storing gasoline in a UST is an abnormally
dangerous activity. While early leaking-UST cases held defendants strictly liable
for leaks, 9 the negligence rule has largely supplanted the strict-liability rule in
UST litigation.90 Many courts have used the Restatement's criteria for

reacting to Meghrig by further constricting leaking-UST victims' available remedies under
RCRA. See Michelle Kok Moritz, Note, Cleaning Up: EquitableConsiderationsin the RCRA
Citizen Suit Provision Controversy,72 IND. L.J. 869 (1997); Hazardous Waste: RCRA Does
Not Allow Past Cost Recovery Even Where DangerIs Ongoing, Court Says, 27 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 1316 (Oct. 11, 1996).
84. See Allison Rittenhouse Hayward, Common Law Remedies and the UST Regulations,
21 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 619, 619 (1994).
85. See id. at 659.
86. See United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565, 1575-76 (10th Cir. 1993) (dicta)
(actually interpreting CERCLA, although noting analysis would be the same under RCRA).
87. See Hayward, supranote 84, at 662-63.
88. See Bennett v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 698 S.W.2d 854, 868-69 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985);
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 519 (1965).
89. See Hayward, supranote 84, at 659.
90. See id.; see also Malone v. Ware Oil Co., 534 N.E.2d 1003, 1006-07 (Il1.App. Ct.
1989) (requiring the plaintiff to prove that the defendant acted negligently or intentionally to
maintain action).
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abnormally dangerous activities9 ' to deny strict liability, noting that USTs are
very common, are valuable in comparison to the danger they pose, or are not
sufficiently dangerous if the owner exercises due care.92 Thus, while strict
liability can be a powerful weapon, courts have effectively removed it from most
UST-victims' hands.
Beyond strict liability, a plaintiff injured by a leaking UST sometimes may
93 nuisance, 94
pursue a variety of other common-law actions, including negligence,"
9s
9
6
trespass, and contract actions. As the Ninth Circuit noted in Meghrig,for UST
victims, "state law do[es] not provide an adequate substitute source of relief." 97

This is because traditional doctrines such as the duty of care, 9 the requirement

of intent to harm, 99 and caveat emptor' 0 act as further barriers to victims of

leaking USTs. In addition, applying traditional common-law doctrines such as
negligence has proven to be extremely time consuming and expensive.''
Moreover, when these victims find themselves excluded from a common-law
remedy, that usually is their final opportunity to receive some compensation for
the harms caused by leaking USTs.
II. PROPOSALS: PLUGGING THE HOLE IN THE LAW OF
LEAKING USTs
Part I of this Note outlined the layers of environmental laws that could

potentially apply to leaking USTs. Unfortunately, despite their complexity, the
laws have left leaking-UST victims largely without an adequate remedy for the
harms they suffer. Those harms include the obligation to help pay for
remediation costs, medical care, lost wages, lower property values, pain,
suffering, and increased health risks. 0 2 The remainder of this Note sets forth five
proposals, each of which would greatly alleviate this unfair gap in the regulatory
scheme of environmental law.
A. End CERCLA 's Petroleum Exclusion

Before addressing the benefits of this specific proposal, there is one major
objection that could be levied against this (as well as the other proposals) that
should be addressed immediately-the effect on the petroleum industry of giving

91. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520.
92. See Hayward, supranote 84, at 659 n.258.
93. See ITALIANO ET AL., supra note 3, at 118.
94. See id. at 146-56.

95. See id.
at 157-61.
96. See id. at 128-38.

97. KFC W., Inc. v. Meghrig, 49 F.3d 518, 524 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 1251
(1996).
98. See Duncan & Bailey, supranote 16, at 271-72.
99. See Hayward, supra note 84, at 665.
100. See Duncan & Bailey, supra note 16, at 266-68.
101. See Chanin, supranote 10, at 368.
102. See id.
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victims of leaking USTs a remedy. Periodically, certain members of Congress
have attempted to overturn the petroleum exclusion, and each time, the petroleum
industry has cried out that subjecting the industry to further liability (beyond the
RCRA regulations and liability as well as liability for oil spills on navigable
waters under the Clean Water Act) would cripple domestic producers. 3 Indeed,
probably the main reason Congress adopted the petroleum exclusion in CERCLA
was because any regulation of the petroleum industry was seen as a threat to the
existence of domestic producers, at a time when America already seemed far too
dependent on foreign oil.'O'
But now, in light of the reduction of the threat of foreign oil, the industry's
arguments are not as persuasive as they were in 1980. The oil-industry crisis of
the 1970s no longer exists, and prices have stabilized.' In fact, despite the dire
predictions in 1980 of the devastating effect Superfund taxes would have on oil
reserves and domestic exploration," ° oil prices have been among the lowest in
history and the nation currently has huge reserves of crude oil.' 7 While the oil
industry is still troubled financially," 8 it can no longer convincingly make the
dire predictions it made in the late 1970s.
Moreover, when the petroleum exclusion was contemplated and finally adopted
in 1980, Congress vastly underestimated the magnitude of the threat from USTs.
CERCLA was prompted by highly publicized visions of abandoned toxic-waste
dumps, such as Love Canal. 0 9 At the time, the only highly visible and wellpublicized threat that existed from the petroleum industry was that of oil tanker
spills on navigable waters: "Those spills constituted a clear and present danger,
and the perception was that there was already statutory protection in place to
combat that danger." 110 As hundreds of thousands of aging tanks made of
unprotected steel have begun to announce their presence in people's drinking
water and real estate, that perception has begun to change."' At the very least,
because the petroleum industry is now more financially secure than in 1980, and
because the threat from leaking USTs is now more apparent than in 1980,
Congress should reevaluate the wisdom of favoring the petroleum industry at the
expense of innocent victims of leaking USTs.
The domestic petroleum industry now concentrates its arguments for
prolonging the petroleum exclusion on the idea that the industry is already paying

103. See Industry Opposes TighteningRCRA Rules, supranote 12, at 41.
104. See Michael M. Gibson & David P. Young, Oil and Gas Exemptions UnderRCRA and
CERCLA: Are They Still "Safe Harbors"Eleven Years Later?, 32 S.T X.L. REv. 361, 364-65
(1991); CarterSigns $227-Billion Excise Tax Measure, OIL & GAS J., Apr. 7, 1980, at 49,49
("'It is beyond rational comprehension that Congress could approve and the President sign a
massive tax on the U.S. oil industry at a time when our domestic and foreign policies are held
hostage to our dependence on foreign oil."') (quoting the president of the Independent
Petroleum Association of America).
105. See Michael Parrish, The Oil Crisis:20 Years Later, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 14, 1993, at DI.
106. See CarterSigns $227-Billion Excise Tax Measure, supra note 104, at 49.
107. See Parrish, supranote 105, at D1.
108. See id
109. See Armstrong, supranote 35, at 1175.
110. Id,
111. See Ritter, supranote 3, at xxiii.
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more than its fair share by being taxed to help finance the Superfund." 2 Yet this
argument lacks persuasiveness since the chemical industry could say the same
thing, and yet it is not at all exempt from CERCLA's reach. Indeed, if a chemical
company buried a tank of pure benzene that was later discovered to be leaking
onto someone's property, that person could recover all remediation costs under
CERCLA." a But if a company buried a tank of gasoline (which contains
benzene) that was later discovered to be leaking onto someone's property, that
person would be exempted from recovering under CERCLA, and would have to
settle for the less protective measures of Subtitle I of RCRA." 4
The argument that the petroleum industry is worthier of protection because of
Americans' reliance on automobiles is likewise not persuasive. For example, the
Clean Air Act has repeatedly required automakers to meet stringent and
expensive new requirements."' Also, if gasoline prices are raised slightly
because of the ending of the petroleum exclusion, then perhaps Americans would
have an extra incentive to ease their environmentally irresponsible overuse of
automobiles.
Finally, if the petroleum exclusion were eliminated, the domestic petroleum
industry might complain that such a measure would cripple domestic
producers." 6 Such a complaint would have validity if it addressed the RCRA oilfield-wastes exemption,"' which excludes oil-field and mining wastes from
regulation. This exemption is designed to allow domestic oil companies to
perform domestic oil exploration, while staying competitive with foreign oil
companies who do not have to deal with such extensive regulations when
exploring outside the United States."' The petroleum industry has produced
statistics indicating that if the oil-field-waste exemption were removed, eighty
percent of the oil wells in the United States would be forced to close." 9
Furthermore, since oil fields are rarely located near unsuspecting populations,
and rarely pose a health risk, 20 the costs to society of the oil-field-waste
exemption do not seem to rival the benefits of maintaining the exemption.
The same cannot be said for CERCLA's petroleum exclusion. Both domestic
and foreign oil companies would be equally subject to citizen suits for the harm
they cause with their USTs. Thus, the benefits of the petroleum exclusion are not
nearly as great as the benefits of the oil-field-waste exemption. In addition, the
ubiquity and hidden nature of USTs in most populated residential areas, as well
as the severity of the harm typically caused by UST leaks mean that the costs of

112. See Armstrong, supranote 35, at 1188.
113. Benzene is listed as a hazardous substance under CERCLA. See 42 U.S.C. §
9601(14)(A)-(F) (1994).
114. See supra Part I.C-D.
115. Most recently, Congress added new limits on emissions of nonmethane hydrocarbons
as well as other pollutants, which were to be completely phased in by 1996. See 42 U.S.C. §
7521(g).
116. See Industry Opposes TighteningRCRA Rules, supranote 12, at 41.
117. See 42 U.S.C. § 6921(b)(2)(A).
118. See Industry Opposes Tightening RCRA Rules, supra note 12, at 41.
119. See id.
120. See id.
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the current petroleum exclusion are much greater than the costs of the oil-fieldwaste exemption. Unlike with the oil-field-waste exemption, the petroleum
industry cannot persuasively argue that they should be treated differently from
other industries.
Beyond leaving victims of leaking USTs without an adequate remedy for cost
recovery and contribution, CERCLA's petroleum exclusion has had another
harmful cost: litigation.' The fact that CERCLA rather mysteriously excludes
petroleum from its definition of a "hazardous substance" while defining such
petroleum constituents as benzene and toluene as hazardous substances has led
to a great deal of litigation. The easiest way to end the river of litigation over the
petroleum exclusion's proper scope would be to eliminate the exclusion.
Finally, ending the petroleum exclusion would not only provide a needed
remedy for victims of leaking USTs and reduce CERCLA litigation, but it would
also make CERCLA simpler. CERCLA desperately needs simplification,'2 and
eliminating the petroleum exclusion is an easy and fair way to begin
accomplishing that aim. It would also simultaneously close a loophole in the
RCRA-CERCLA regulatory scheme that has allowed too many innocent victims
to fall through without a remedy.1'
B. Expand Subtitle I ofRCRA to Mimic the CostRecovery Provisions ofCERCLA

This proposal is just another way to accomplish the goal advocated by the first
proposal: allow victims of leaking USTs a similar remedy as is available to
victims of other toxic-chemical leaks or dumps. As more and more tanks decayed
to a state of leaking, Subtitle I of RCRA was passed to address the "new"
problem of leaking USTs. 24 Unfortunately, Congress reduced the private costrecovery remedies avail4ble to the innocent landowner who discovers a leaking
UST, and virtually ignored the plight of the person harmed by groundwater
contamination resulting from a nearby UST leak. 5 In so doing, Congress not
only foreclosed remedies for victims of leaking USTs, but as with CERCLA,
made the mistake of underestimating the power of granting a private cause of
action.

121. See Peter Hong & Michele Galen, The Toxic Mess CalledSuperfund, Bus. WK., May
11, 1992, at 32, 32-33.
122. See Norman W. Bernstein, Superfund Reform Needs Drastic Simplification, 25 Envtl.

L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,008 (Jan. 1995).
123. Victims are continuing to fall through every day. See, e.g., Illinois Court Dismisses
CERCLA, RCRA Suitfor Failureto State Claim, MEALEY'S LMG. REP.: SUPERFUND, Sept. 23,
1996, at 10 (reporting the dismissal of CERCLA, RCRA, and state-law UST claims); No
Recoveryfor Cost of PastCleanup UnderRCRA, IllinoisJudge Rules, MEALEY'S LITG. REP.:
SUPERFUND, Sept. 23, 1996, at 9 (reporting the dismissal of RCRA and state-law UST claims).
124. See. Mary Elizabeth Bosco & Russell V. Randle, UndergroundStorage Tanks (UST),
in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 71, at 607, 607.

125. See supra Part I.C-D.
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Originally, the heart of CERCLA was the government clean-up trust fund, or
"Superfund."1 26 However, the private cost-recovery mechanisms that were added
nearly as an afterthought have become the center of CERCLA activity and
litigation. 127 A possible explanation for the diminution of private causes of action
under Subtitle I could be that even after CERCLA had been in place for four
years, Congress still had not yet realized its misjudgment.'28
Handled properly, a statutory private right of action can be a very powerful and
efficient tool. 129 For instance, when a UST victim has the capability of suing to
enforce the provisions of an environmental statute, it lessens the burden on (and
cost to) the government. The government can act as a referee, rather than the
driving force, throughout the litigation.
Likewise, as Subtitle I currently stands, if an oil company ceased using the tank
before 1974, it cannot be held liable at all for any leaks. 3 ° But if victims of
leaking USTs are permitted to more effectively and completely hold companies
liable for their past abandonment of USTs, it would provide strong motivation
for those companies to then scour their records and locate and contain any
additional abandoned USTs. Containing a UST before it leaks is obviously much
less expensive than remedying it after it leaks. Oil companies would be
encouraged to contain old USTs before any leaks become apparent or cause
harm, thereby saving themselves money while also preventing many other future
environmental disasters. Thus, allowing victims of leaking USTs an effective
cause of action for past harm can serve the policy goal of pollution prevention.
C. Allow for Full Victim Compensation
The harms caused by leaking USTs extend far beyond clean-up costs,' yet the
federal statutory scheme does not address any of those additional harms.' The
only avenue to full recovery for victims of leaking USTs has been common-law
actions, which usually are riddled with obstacles.' 32 A federal scheme should be
enacted making it easier for victims of leaking USTs (and victims of other toxic
pollution) to sue and collect for such items as medical costs, property damages,
and loss of wages. Such a measure would serve two beneficial purposes. First,
it would have the obvious benefit of compensating innocent victims of leaking
USTs, who were harmed through drinking-water contamination and/or property
damage. Second, these damages would serve a preventive function, providing
further incentive for oil companies to seek out their aging, abandoned USTs and
contain them before they began to leak.

126. See Stoll, supra note 72, at 77.
127. See id.
128. CERCLA was enacted in 1980, and Subtitle I was enacted in 1984.
129. The folloiving argument applies equally to the previous section, Part HI.A.
130. See WOROBEC & HOGUE, supra note 75, at 188.
131. See supraPart I.A.
132. See supraPart I.E.
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In 1984, a federal victim-compensation scheme was proposed by the
Environmental Law Institute ("ELI"),133 and while the political climate was not
receptive to it at the time, perhaps now it could gain wider acceptance.13 The
scheme took the form of a model statute. It established a strict-liability cause of
action for victims of toxic substances, with compensation available for personal
and property damages. ELI proposed the strict-liability scheme as well as the
relaxing of the rules of evidence to prevent difficult issues of causation from
killing most causes of action. 35 Instead, a series of rebuttable presumptions
would be established. The scheme was to be funded by a "hazard fee" on
hazardous-substance producers and users. 136 Later that year, a similar federal
statutory-compensation scheme was recommended by a congressionally
appointed study group. 37 Congress has also briefly considered a scheme that has
been in place in Japan since the early 1970s. 31 Japan's scheme also relies upon
a polluter tax to support a national fund, compensating pollution victims for their
functions similarly to
injuries. The claim procedure is administrative and
39
workers' compensation statutes in the United States.
A simpler proposal would be to define the storage of gasoline in USTs in
populated areas or near underground drinking-water supplies as an "abnormally
dangerous activity." Such a statutory definition, calling for strict liability to be
applied in common-law
suits, would aid victims of leaking USTs
40
immeasurably.1
Any one of these compensation proposals would aid the victims of leaking
USTs. At the very least, their possible present-day application should be
carefully studied and evaluated.

133. See J. William Futrell, The EnvironmentalLaw Institute Study: Statutory Reform of
Toxic Torts, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,108 (Mar. 1984).
134. For instance, now the wide-ranging dangers of leaking USTs are better known, and oil
companies are also better able to pay their fair share of the damage they cause. See supraPart
II.A.
135. Causation issues are perhaps the largest obstacle for common-law UST plaintiffs. See
supraPart I.E.
136. See JEFFREY TRAUBERMAN, STATUTORY REFORM OF TOxic TORTS 119 (Environmental
Law Inst. ed., 1983); Futrell, supra note 133, at 10,109.
137. See Frank P. Grad, Remedies for Injuries Causedby Hazardous Waste: The Report and
Recommendations ofthe Superfund 301(e) Study Group, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10,105, 10,107 (Mar. 1984).
138. See STAFF OF HousE COMM. ON PUB. WORKS AND TRANsP., 96TH CONG.,

COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF WATER POLLUTION 299-306 (Comm. Print 1979).
139. See id
140. See Chanin, supra note 10, at 403-04.
[Strict liability] removes difficult barriers to recovery that exist under negligence
and nuisance theories relating to issues of fault and reasonableness. It ensures that
a LUST [leaking underground storage tank] victim will be compensated for his
personal and property injuries on a simple showing that his damages were caused
by an actor's leaking tanks. The victim will, of course, still have to prove his
damages ....
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D. Fill the Void with State Law
Any of the above proposals' 4 ' could be implemented on a state, rather than
national, level. Indeed, RCRA specifically allows for state UST programs that
are more stringent or allow for more recovery than the federal regulations.'42 For
example, Indiana's UST statute mimics the language of RCRA in most respects,
but the private contribution-action language mimics CERCLA.'43 The first court
to interpret the contribution section held that the Indiana legislature intended for
the more broad contribution provisions of CERCLA to apply.'"
E. Expressly Allow for Common-Law Suits
At a minimum, Congress should include a provision in Subtitle I stating that
nothing in RCRA is intended to foreclose any potential common-law causes of
action. As unfair as it seems, there have been courts that have held that all
common-law causes of action against responsible parties are foreclosed if the
victim of a leaking UST receives any clean-up compensation under Subtitle I.
As difficult and unsatisfactory as common-law actions are for victims of leaking
USTs, they are currently the only available method for recovering health and
property damages, and to deny that opportunity to pursue those damages would
be grossly unfair.
CONCLUSION

The threat to the environment and human health from leaking USTs is
immense. Most of the nearly two million USTs in the United States do not
contain corrosion protection, making leakage inevitable over time. 6 UST
leakage creates property damage and often contaminates groundwater, rendering
it poisonous until expensive and time-consuming remediation is performed.
Professor Joseph Sax polled the nation's environmental-law professors and
found despair with the subject, "a sense of being drawn into a system in which
enormous energy must be expended on something that is ultimately vacuous." '47
A major reason for this is that environmental law, "once uncovered after
painstaking study and acronym translation, often turns out to be nothing more
than incantations of impossible promises . . . [and] loopholes for favored
industries."' 48 The law of leaking USTs is a prime example of this. It is a

141. See supra Part II.A-C.
142. See 42 U.S.C. § 6929 (1994).
143. See IND. CODE § 13-23-13-8(b) (1996). Title 13 of the Indiana Code was recodified by
the Indiana legislature in 1996. Section 13-23-13-8(b) is the revised citation.
144. See The Pantry, Inc. v. Stop-N-Go Foods, Inc., 777 F. Supp. 713, 720 (S.D. Ind. 1991).
145. See Hayward, supranote 84, at 662-63.
146. See Ritter, supra note 3, at xxiii.
147. Joseph L. Sax, EnvironmentalLaw in the Law Schools: What We Teach and How We
FeelAbout It, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,251, 10,251 (June 1989).
148. Bobertz, supra note 19, at 712-13 (citations omitted).
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complicated system of laws that in the end offers shockingly little protection to
the victim of a leaking UST and a shockingly large loophole for the petroleum
industry to escape liability that similarly situated chemical companies must face.
This Note has endeavored to illuminate the gap in the regulation of leaking
USTs, and more importantly, it has attempted to offer some proposals for
improving the efficacy and fairness of UST law. Environmental law does not
have to invoke a sense of despair. Just as the law of contracts did not develop
overnight, so we should not expect environmental law to be fully developed after
only a short history. Our task simply should be to continually improve
environmental law by seeking out and correcting its flaws. Plugging the hole in
the law of leaking USTs would be one such improvement.

